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Neuroscientific approaches to drug addiction traditionally have been based on the premise that
addiction is a process that results from brain changes that in turn result from chronic administration of
drugs of abuse. An alternative approach views drug addiction as a behavioral disorder in which drugs
function as preeminent reinforcers. Although there is a fundamental discrepancy between these two
approaches, the emerging neuroscience of reinforcement and choice behavior eventually may shed
light on the brain mechanisms involved in excessive drug use. Behavioral scientists could assist in this
understanding by devoting more attention to the assessment of differences in the reinforcing strength
of drugs and by attempting to develop and validate behavioral models of addiction.
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Drug addiction continues to take a massive
toll in terms of economic loss and human
misery. For the purpose of this article, we
define drug addiction as the final outcome of
a process that begins with occasional drug-
taking, and ends with consumption of exces-
sive amounts of drug to the detriment of
society and the individual. Drug addiction is
a chronic, relapsing disorder that provides
research and treatment challenges to scientists
from widely ranging disciplines. Among these,
geneticists and epidemiologists are particularly
intrigued by the fact that drug-taking behavior
exists on a continuum in humans: some
people engage in it to excess, most in
moderation, and many not at all.
Clearly, genetic differences and specific
societal-environmental conditions can play
a role in the development of drug abuse.
Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists attend
more to the individual characteristics of the
drug abuser, and consider how other cognitive
co-morbidities, such as anxiety or depression,
contribute to the development and mainte-
nance of drug abuse and addiction. Pharma-
cologists tend to focus on the drugs them-
selves, studying their mechanisms of action
and attempting to develop potential drug
antagonists that might be useful in the
treatment of drug abuse. And behavioral
pharmacologists look for clues to the etiology
and control of drug abuse in the effects of
drugs on the behavior of humans or animals
under controlled experimental conditions.
Neuroscience, because it searches for rela-
tionships between brain function and behav-
ior, is in an especially appropriate position to
study the neural correlates of the behavior of
drug abuse, and neuroscientists have contrib-
uted a tremendous amount to our understand-
ing of the effects of drugs of abuse on the
brain and nervous system. This article will
address some of the neuroscience research on
the problem of drug abuse, but will touch only
on limited aspects of what is a massive area of
scientific inquiry.
The first section on brain reward circuitry is
included because this is the neuroanatomical
basis for virtually all hypotheses and research
on the neuroscience of drug abuse. The next
section describes some recent research from
a few of the many neuroscientists who have
concentrated their efforts on drug addiction.
What is interesting and somewhat distressing
for behavioral scientists is how little behavior is
regarded in much of this research.
Because drug addiction generally is con-
ceived as a process caused directly by chronic
administration of drugs of abuse, the investi-
gative effort is concentrated on a search for
changes in the morphology or molecular
biology in relevant parts of the brain as
a function of chronic drug administration.
The neuroscience skills and techniques used
by these investigations are formidable, and
interesting neuronal changes have been ob-
served following chronic drug administration.
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Even more technically fascinating is the
possibility of recreating these localized neuro-
biological changes in the absence of drug
administration—in effect producing an ad-
dicted brain without giving the addicting
substance. Animals so treated then can be
evaluated behaviorally, to determine whether
they are, in fact, addicted. Unfortunately, the
behavioral measures used in these types of
studies often are weak and not validated,
bringing the conclusions of much of this work
into question.
Our generally negative critique of much of
the most prominent work on the neuroscience
of drug abuse is followed by a description of
a strictly behavioral approach to drug abuse.
This behavioral approach is presented as an
additional avenue to be explored by neuro-
scientists and others investigating drug abuse.
We argue that drug addiction involves the
excessive choice of a drug over other environ-
mental stimuli, perhaps because the drug is
a more potent reinforcer relative to competing
reinforcers in the addict’s life. This section
serves two purposes: one is to present an
option to the neuroscience approach and to
suggest how addiction can be described more
appropriately; the other is to prepare for the
next section which returns to neuroscience,
but in a more behavioral context.
In this next section, we describe some
experiments that indicate that neuroscience
embedded in a more behavioral context
potentially can identify the neurological cor-
relates of behavioral constructs, such as re-
inforcer strength. For example, investigations
of the brain correlates of choice eventually
may clarify the regions in the brain and the
patterns of brain activity that are correlated
with preference for higher magnitude rein-
forcers. Although the work described in this
section does not involve studies of drugs as
reinforcers per se, it easily could be extended
to complement a behavioral model of addic-
tion.
The behavioral approach to drug addiction
presupposes that drugs are not qualitatively
different from non-drug reinforcers. The last
section of this article describes recent neuro-
scientific studies that assess the validity of this
assumption. For example, do the brain
changes that accompany reinforcement differ
if the stimulus is cocaine compared with other
non-drug stimuli?
Finally, the perspectives offered in this
paper are limited by both space and our time.
It would add useful knowledge to review what
is known about the neuroanatomy and neuro-
physiology of Pavlovian conditioning (e.g.,
Cardinal & Everitt, 2004; LeDoux, 2000). Also
useful would be a discussion of several
psychological theories that have been posited
to explain drug addiction, many of which were
put forward by neuroscientists and based on
hypothesized or observed drug-induced brain
changes (e.g., Koob & Le Moal, 1997; Lub-
man, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2004; Robinson &
Berridge, 1993, 2000). However, our interest
in data rather than theories led us to exclude
this conjunction of drug addiction and neu-
roscience.
NEUROANATOMY OF REWARD
In a simplified view, the brain can be
thought of as the locus for the retrieval,
processing, and storage of information trans-
mitted from the environment via neurons. The
brain also activates motor, autonomic, and/or
endocrine output in response to both the
current and historical environment. Quite a bit
is known about the location of the specific
sensory input and motor output areas of the
brain, but less is understood about the brain
structures and processes involved in the
formation of constructs such as values, emo-
tions, and memories (see review by Glimcher,
2003). The current general concept of input
and output anatomy within the brain involves
parallel sensory and motor circuits that can be
described as cortical-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-
cortical (Heimer, 2003). These circuits carry
information from either the somatosensory
cortex or the motor cortex to related areas in
the putamen. Circuits run medially from the
putamen to the globus pallidus or to the
substantia nigra, and the globus pallidus sends
projections to specific areas of the thalamus.
The thalamus closes the loop by returning
information to local areas of the cortex. The
key concept in these circuits is topographical
organization. Different parts of each of these
anatomical areas are activated depending on
the nature (e.g., visual, auditory, nociceptive)
and location (e.g., finger, arm, head) of the
information being received and conveyed.
The association areas of the brain also may
be connected in several circuits that run
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somewhat parallel to the input and output
circuits. One such circuit, called the anterior
cingulate circuit (Alexander, DeLong, &
Strick, 1986), incorporates much of what is
thought to be involved in the brain’s motiva-
tional pathways (Kalivas, Churchill, & Klite-
nick, 1993). A locus of particular importance
in this pathway is the ventral striatum which
includes the nucleus accumbens. Dopamine
release in this area has been considered
a critical mediator of the reinforcing effects
of stimuli, including drugs of abuse (Koob &
LeMoal, 1997; Robbins & Everett, 1996),
although some investigators suggest a more
general activating effect of dopamine (Horvitz,
2000). Dopamine is released into the ventral
striatum via dopaminergic neurons that pro-
ject from the ventral tegmentum (Figure 1).
The ventral tegmentum also sends dopami-
nergic neurons to dorsal striatal and cortical
areas. The ventral striatum has non-dopami-
nergic, primarily glutamatergic, input from
the amygdala and hippocampus, which are
involved in memory and emotional processing.
Many of these pathways are reciprocal, with
information passing back to the structure that
originated the stimulation.
The cortical areas involved in reward cir-
cuitry are thought to include the entorhinal
and perirhinal cortices, the anterior cingulate
cortex, the temporal lobe and the posterior
area of the medial orbital frontal cortex.
Projections from these cortical areas travel to
the ventral striatum as well. In the ventral
striatum there is close interdigitation with
pallidal structures, and there are neuronal
connections from the striatum to the ventral
pallidum, the internal globus pallidus, and
down to the substantia nigra pars reticulata.
The medial dorsal thalamus is innervated by
fibers from the pallidal areas, and thalamic
projections complete the circuit by traveling to
the anterior cingulate cortex.
Thus, a cortical-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-cor-
tical circuit can be described in the emotional
areas of the brain. The cortical areas are
different from those involved in motor control
and sensory input; the striatal and pallidal
areas typically are located more ventrally, have
considerable non-cortical input, and a distinct
thalamic nucleus is involved. Nevertheless, this
circuit has parallels with other primary circuits
in the brain (Alexander et al., 1986; Heimer,
2003).
What clearly is missing is how the various
circuits are interconnected to integrate the
sensory input with the motor output. This
question stimulates much of the research on
the neurocircuitry of reward. Although the
parallel circuitry suggests that integration is
possible at many cortical and subcortical levels,
the precise pathways whereby sensory input is
evaluated, modified by processes associated
with memorial, emotional, and motivational
factors, and converted into motor output have
not been delineated clearly. It has been
thought that the nucleus accumbens, with its
shell and core components, as well as its strong
connection to various amygdaloid nuclei, is
critical to emotional coordination of behavior-
al output.
The extended amygdala is a fairly recently
described structure that is an important part of
this system; it consists of two components. One
includes the central amygdaloid nucleus and
the lateral bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,
and carves a sweeping circuit beneath the
main body of the striatum and the globus
pallidus. The other consists of the medial
amygdaloid nucleus and the medial bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis, and travels
along with the central component under the
lenticular nuclei (Alheid, 2003). The central
and medial nuclei of the amygdala have
substantial input from the basal lateral nucleus
of the amygdala and many projections to the
cortex and to autonomic and endocrine areas
in the hypothalamus and brain stem. As noted
by Heimer (2003), ‘‘Thus, [the extended
amygdala] represents a strategically placed
ring formation capable of coordinating activ-
ities in regions of the multiple limbic lobe
forebrain for the development of coherent
behavioral responses through the referenced
output channels’’ (p. 1735).
It is in the various parts of this reward circuit
anatomy and its connection with motor
circuitry where neuroscientists look for brain
changes that reflect reinforced behavior.
NEUROSCIENTISTS LOOK FOR
DRUG-RELATED BRAIN CHANGES
Neuroscientists primarily interested in drug
abuse typically search for changes in some
aspect of the reward circuitry that accompany
the development of drug addiction. This
presupposes a consensus on what addiction
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is, and most neuroscientists agree that drug
addiction is a behavioral disorder. They usually
define addiction in humans as a change over
time from occasional drug taking to more
‘‘compulsive’’ drug taking, and a ‘‘loss of
control’’ over the amount of drug taken.
Addiction is further viewed as a chronic
disorder that persists as a sustained suscepti-
bility to relapse (‘‘craving’’) even if an in-
dividual has abstained from drug use for an
extended period of time.
Despite a common definition of the disor-
der, and despite the fact that there are some
models that might reflect compulsive drug
Fig. 1. (Top) Structures related to reward pathway visible on midline of brain. Dark lines indicate dopamine
pathways. (Bottom) Relation of thalamus (with lateral thalamic nuclei) to the more lateral caudate nucleus and globus
pallidus.
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taking (Ahmed & Koob, 1998; Ahmed, Walker,
& Koob, 2000; Deneau, Yanagita, & Seevers,
1969), few of these neuroscientists use or
describe an animal model of ‘‘compulsive’’
or ‘‘uncontrolled’’ drug taking as part of their
evaluation of accompanying brain changes.
Measures of the reinforcing effects of drugs
(drug self-administration) are used by several
neuroscientists as indicators of the develop-
ment of addiction. Even more popular are
measures of sensitization (an increase over time
in the locomotor stimulating effects of a drug
as a consequence of repeated administration
of the drug), conditioned place preference (a
selection by the animal of an environment
where it previously experienced the effect of
a drug), and reinstatement (an increase in
extinguished, drug-maintained responding as
a consequence of non-contingent drug admin-
istration, stress, or other intervention). How-
ever, as indices of addiction, these measures
leave much to be desired.
Although drug self-administration proce-
dures seem to reflect the subjective drug
effects reported by human drug addicts
(Griffiths & Balster, 1979), the relation be-
tween this and the critical outcome—excessive
behavior that is the hallmark of addiction—
has not been determined.
Sensitization has only the fact that it is
produced by repeated administration of
a drug, and is maintained for several weeks
or months following drug withdrawal, to
recommend it as a model of addiction. This
drug-induced increase in locomotion lacks
even face validity as an indicator of compulsive
drug taking or loss of control of drug-taking
behavior. Conditioned place preference prob-
ably measures a different process from either
reinforcement or sensitization (Bardo & Bev-
ins, 2000), but there is no evidence that this is
related to addiction. Reinstatement has good
face validity, but has not been shown to have
predictive validity as a model of relapse (Katz
& Higgins, 2003).
It can be argued that the lack of a validated
behavioral measure of addiction is the biggest
impediment for neuroscientists who focus on
brain changes associated with chronic drug
administration. Despite these challenges, the
actual neuroscience is typically innovative and
productive. One of the most provocative
neural changes that occurs as a consequence
of drug administration involves drug-induced
alterations in gene expression. Alterations in
gene expression, with their consequent
changes in protein synthesis, are considered
to be a neural aspect of learning and memory,
or ‘‘plasticity’’ as it is referred to by neuro-
scientists. Learning and memory may have
neural mechanisms in common with drug
abuse because both reflect changes in rein-
forced behavior over extended time periods.
Neuroscientists, stating that drug addiction is
a relatively stable condition, are especially
interested in gene expression changes that
have an extended duration.
There are many places where gene expres-
sion can be modified. The group headed by
Eric Nestler has emphasized long-term, drug-
induced changes in transcription factors as
a potentially critical aspect of gene expression
that might be related to drug addiction.
Transcription factors are proteins that attach
to the part of DNA that is responsible for the
rate at which this DNA is transferred to RNA
and subsequently to the rate of synthesis of
specific proteins. A number of neurotransmit-
ters act through their membrane receptors
to alter levels of transcription factors.
Because drugs of abuse can directly affect the
action of some neurotransmitters on their
receptors, this is a logical place to begin to
look for the effects of drugs on protein
synthesis.
A recent review (Nestler, 2004) describes
two transcription factors that his laboratory
has evaluated that meet some of their criteria
as important factors in drug addiction. Both of
these, CREB (cAMP response element binding
protein) and deltaFos B, are increased in the
nucleus accumbens following chronic admin-
istration of cocaine. Elevated levels of CREB
are fairly short lasting, declining within several
days after cocaine administration has been
stopped. They also are associated with de-
creased sensitivity to a wide variety of stimuli,
including drugs of abuse (Barrot et al., 2002;
McClung & Nestler, 2003), and seem unlikely
to be strongly related to drug addiction.
DeltaFos B, in contrast, increases a small
amount with each injection of cocaine and
is unusually stable in the brain, remaining
at elevated levels for several weeks follow-
ing termination of cocaine administration
(McClung & Nestler, 2003). It is therefore
a more interesting candidate as a correlate of
drug addiction.
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Levels of deltaFos B can be modified in the
nucleus accumbens and the dorsal striatum of
mice (the same areas in which they are
increased by cocaine administration) using
technically sophisticated procedures that do
not involve cocaine administration. If elevated
striatal deltaFos B levels play a role in drug
addiction, mice with enhanced striatal delta-
Fos B levels in the absence of cocaine exposure
should respond differently to cocaine than
mice with normal striatal deltaFos B levels. A
variety of behavioral indices support this
hypothesis. Mice with elevated striatal deltaFos
B levels exhibited greater preference for the
cocaine-paired compartment in a conditioned
place preference study, relative to controls
(McClung & Nestler, 2003). In addition, these
mice self-administered smaller doses of co-
caine than controls and completed higher
ratios than control mice on progressive-ratio
schedules (Colby, Whisler, Steffen, Nestler, &
Self, 2003).
Interestingly, these effects appear to be
somewhat specific to cocaine; the two groups
did not differ in terms of food-maintained
responding. These results suggest that higher
striatal levels of deltaFos B may be correlated
with enhanced sensitivity to the incentive
properties of cocaine. However, an important
comparison that was not made was to de-
termine whether mice with histories of chronic
cocaine self-administration, and presumably
cocaine-induced increases in deltaFos B, also
showed similar patterns of responding as those
mice with artificially increased deltaFos B
expression.
A driving concern of neuroscientists is
identification of the proteins that are synthe-
sized in increased amounts as a result of
deltaFos B and CREB overexpression. Several
candidates have been suggested, among them
a gut and brain protein, cholesystokinin, and
an endogenous kappa receptor ligand, dynor-
phin (McClung & Nestler, 2003; Nestler,
2004). A subunit of a glutamate receptor also
has been found to increase with overexpres-
sion of deltaFos B (Nestler, 2004). In addition,
another peptide, Cdk5, is increased in animals
that overexpress deltaFos B, and Cdk5 gene
expression also is increased by chronic cocaine
administration. Cdk5 may effectively reduce
the effects of dopamine that are produced
through the D1-like receptors (Benavides &
Bibb, 2004). These receptors have some
actions that oppose those of the D2-like
receptors, and it is the D2-like receptors that
have been tied more closely to the stimulating
and addictive effects of cocaine.
Research in the laboratory of Peter Kalivas
has emphasized another protein, Homer, as
being particularly important in the develop-
ment of cocaine addiction. This research
group has studied the importance of gluta-
mate, the excitatory neurotransmitter that is
released by the neural connections that travel
from the prefrontal cortex and amygdala to
the nucleus accumbens and ventral tegmental
area, in mediating the neuronal plasticity
involved in drug addiction. They suggest that
dopamine release may underlie the develop-
ment of addiction, but that the permanent
changes resulting in sensitization and rein-
statement involve protein changes that regu-
late glutamate transmission (Kalivas, 2004).
The Homer protein is associated with
glutamate receptors, where it acts as a scaffold
to keep relevant proteins in association with
each other. Mice that had one of three Homer
genes knocked out developed a conditioned
place preference to a smaller dose of cocaine
than did normal mice and, at larger cocaine
doses, spent more time on the cocaine-
associated area of the apparatus than did
normal mice. These knock-out mice also
showed a greater sensitization to cocaine than
did wild-type mice, and learned to self-admin-
ister a small dose of cocaine more rapidly than
wild-type littermates. In addition, the knock-
out mice had reduced levels of accumbens
glutamate, similar to what had been found in
mice that had been given cocaine chronically
and then withdrawn. The similar effects of
Homer deletion and cocaine withdrawal on
accumbens biochemistry, as well as the finding
that the Homer knock-out mice showed
sensitization to the effects of cocaine without
having received prior injections of cocaine,
suggested that Homer proteins or the proteins
that are bonded together by Homer, are
important in the development of cocaine
addiction (Szumlinski et al., 2004).
Terry Robinson has maintained an interest
in brain changes that accompany the develop-
ment of sensitization to drugs of abuse. The
incentive-sensitization theory developed by
Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2000) posits
that the neural changes accompanying drug
administration are directly responsible for
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both sensitization and the development of
compulsive drug-taking behavior. Tests of this
theory have found that either the length of
neuronal dendrites, the number of branches
in the dendrites, and/or the concentration of
the spines that come off the dendrites were
increased in rats following either experiment-
er-administered or self-administered amphet-
amine. Cocaine and nicotine produced similar
increases in dendritic branching and density
in the accumbens and prefrontal cortex, but,
interestingly, morphine produced significant
decreases in these measures. The changes in
dendritic morphology were relatively long
lasting, running in close parallel with the
duration of sensitization (Robinson & Kolb,
2004), and the brain structures in which these
changes were greatest differed depending on
the drugs (cocaine vs. amphetamine) given
and whether the drugs were given passively or
taken by the animals.
These studies of the molecular, biological,
and morphological changes that accompany
administration of drugs of abuse make the
general point that such changes can, in fact,
be measured. The neuroscientists who are
finding these drug-induced brain changes
have not claimed that these are necessarily
the essential components of drug addiction;
the brain is sufficiently complex and there are
so many aspects of its activity that can be
modified, that the search for correlates to
addiction is necessarily a long-term one. These
investigators, however, do hold to the debat-
able position that addiction constitutes drug-
induced changes in the brain.
We would like to propose an alternative to
this drug-focused approach to drug addiction
by treating drugs as reinforcing stimuli that
may come to dominate the behavioral reper-
toire of some individuals. This domination
may occur as the result of the relative efficacy
of certain drugs as reinforcers; that is, the
strength of these reinforcers relative to other
concurrently available reinforcers in the envi-
ronment. This approach is one we favor and is
described in more detail in the following
section.
DRUG ADDICTION AS A
BEHAVORAL DISORDER
Behavioral scientists generally regard drug
addiction as a behavioral disorder that results
when drug reinforcers assume control over
a substantial portion of an individual’s behav-
ioral repertoire (Higgins, Heil, & Lussier,
2004). As such, addiction to drugs can be
considered a form of excessive behavior,
occurring when other activities are expected
and appropriate. Overeating and excessive
gambling are other examples of inappropriate
and excessive behaviors often attributed to an
addiction of some kind, but do not involve
drug administration. A characteristic of each is
that initial exposure to a reinforcing stimulus
(e.g., euphoria, food, money) is followed by
a progressive escalation in the behavior that
produced it. Behavior that results in the
availability of these reinforcers may eventually
dominate the behavioral repertoire simply
because these stimuli function as more potent
reinforcers than others available in an individ-
ual’s environment. This may be due, in part, to
genetic predispositions or, more likely, to
particular learning histories combined with
relatively easy access to these reinforcers (i.e.,
a high rate of reinforcement) and insufficient
contact with alternative sources of reinforce-
ment.
One advantage of a behavioral approach to
drug abuse is that, contrary to the drug-based
neuroscience theories, it not only accounts for
excessive behavior that does not involve drugs,
but it also accounts for situations in which
repeated exposure to drugs is not followed by
addiction. For example, people who use drugs
to excess while they are young are likely to stop
using drugs when they get older, a process
called maturing out (Chen & Kandel, 1995).
When a young person is exposed to reinforcers
that are incompatible with drug taking, such as
those associated with marriage, family, and
employment, the relative reinforcing functions
of drugs usually decrease to the point where
they no longer maintain the drug-taking
behavior. People who do not mature out of
their excessive drug taking may not have these
other reinforcers available, may not seek them
out, or may not find them to be superior to the
drugs they are taking due to particular
learning histories and/or genetic predisposi-
tions.
As a second example of repeated drug use
not leading inevitably to addiction, consider
that soldiers who used heroin to excess while
in combat situations in Vietnam typically did
not continue this use when they returned
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home (Robins, 1994). A third situation occurs
in patients who self-administer opioids for the
treatment of pain but have no inclination to
continue to use the drug following recovery.
The reinforcing effect of the drug in this case
is related to its ability to reduce pain, and
following recovery there is no reason to
continue to use the drug. There is also the
fact that a great many people have successfully
stopped smoking cigarettes, at least in part
because the health risks became overwhelm-
ingly obvious (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2004). It clearly is not the case that
simple exposure to drugs, even in the context
of their strong reinforcing effects, necessarily
leads to a permanent state of drug addiction.
A behavioral approach also is much more
hopeful about the potential for treating drug
addiction (Higgins et al., 2004). Theories that
subscribe to drug-induced changes in the
nervous system present more hopeless scenar-
ios (once-a-drug-addict-always-a-drug-addict)
that are more likely bereft of treatment
possibilities. Behavioral management of drug
use, however, is one of the most successful
intervention strategies, particularly with co-
caine abuse for which there is no pharmaco-
logical treatment yet available. Contingency
management procedures typically involve giv-
ing patients vouchers if they have drug-free
urine samples on a regular basis. The vouchers
can be exchanged for various goods and
services. Some contingency management ther-
apies increase the value of the voucher over
time, as long as the client remains drug free,
and resets the value if cocaine use is detected
or if the client refuses to submit a urine
sample. These procedures were far superior to
standard therapy in producing drug-free cli-
ents and retaining them in treatment over a 24-
week study (Higgins et al., 1993). At this point,
a behavioral approach is uniquely able to
generate successful strategies for prevention
and treatment.
If one finds a behavior/reinforcement ap-
proach to drug abuse and addiction more
satisfying than the notion that drugs them-
selves are responsible for drug addiction, does
that make neuroscience an irrelevant perspec-
tive on drug addiction? Certainly not. But it
does mean that a rather different type of
neuroscience should be evaluated for what it
might contribute to our understanding of
addictive behavior. For example, neuroscien-
tists are beginning to look at activity in the
brain that accompanies choices between re-
inforcing stimuli that differ in magnitude or
frequency, as described below (e.g., Cromwell
& Schultz, 2003; Platt & Glimcher, 1999).
Although drugs have yet to be evaluated in this
type of work, the work could easily progress to
this point in the future, and understanding the
neurological correlates of the reinforcing
strength of drugs may lead to a more unified




Can neurophysiological and neurobiochem-
ical studies provide indicators of the relative
reinforcing effects of various stimuli? If so,
knowing the neurological correlates of the
relative reinforcing effects of stimuli might
allow us to predict choice at the behavioral
level. In addition, if addiction is accompanied
by an increase in the reinforcing effects of
drugs relative to other stimuli, this could be
reflected in such neurological measures. Neu-
ronal changes have been measured in various
parts of the brain upon the delivery of
a reinforcer. Experiments assessing brain
responses to reinforcers of different magni-
tude often involve the use of a discrete-trial
delayed reaction task (Cromwell & Schultz,
2003; Hassani, Cromwell, & Schultz, 2001;
Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Tremblay & Schultz,
1999; Watanabe, Hikosaka, Sakagami, & Shra-
kawa, 2002). In a typical procedure, a monkey
learned to emit a response, either holding
a lever or fixating on a visual stimulus, and to
maintain that response for several seconds.
This resulted in the presentation of a discrim-
inative stimulus (signaled delay) for a few
seconds followed by the presentation of
another discriminative stimulus (trigger) that
signaled the availability of a reinforcer contin-
gent upon a manual or visual saccade re-
sponse. In some studies, it was necessary for
the monkey to withhold responding following
the presentation of one cue and to respond
following presentation of another cue (go-no
go task) either to earn a reinforcer or to
advance to the next trial. In other studies,
a discriminative stimulus indicated whether or
not a reinforcer would be delivered upon the
emission of the response. In a variation of the
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task, the magnitude or type (preferred vs.
nonpreferred) of reinforcer was signaled.
Neurons that fired during various aspects of
this task were recorded and described.
The activity of single neurons in a number
of brain structures has been measured during
the delay between the presentation of the
discriminative stimulus and the reinforced
response. Neurons in the ventral tegmentum,
the ventral striatum, the caudate and putamen
(striatum), the orbital frontal cortex, and
various areas of the parietal and prefrontal
cortex have been studied most frequently. In
general, neurons located in all of the tested
areas fired more rapidly during the delay when
a larger reinforcer, as opposed to a smaller
reinforcer, was signaled. Platt and Glimcher
(1999), using a visual saccade task, reported
this differential response from neurons in the
lateral intraparietal area of the posterior
parietal cortex as well as in the superior
colliculus, a part of the visual pathway. In
several studies, a smaller proportion of neu-
rons were identified that fired in an exactly
opposite pattern, showing greater activity
when the smaller reinforcer was signaled.
Tremblay and Schultz (1999) found this
pattern of differentiation using recordings
from the six-layer area of the orbitofrontal
cortex of primates; a subset of orbitofrontal
cells fired more in response to cues predicting
reinforcer A than to reinforcer B when A was
preferred, and more to B than to C when B was
preferred. A similar pattern of differentiation
was found in the anterior parts of caudate
nucleus, putamen, and ventral striatum
(Cromwell & Schultz, 2003; Hassani et al.,
2001).
The lateral prefrontal cortex also appeared
to code the significance of stimuli and re-
inforcement. Some neurons in this location
were particularly active during the delay that
followed the onset of a stimulus correlated
with reinforcement. Others were more active
following the presentation of a stimulus cor-
related with unreinforced trials. Some lateral
prefrontal neurons fired more rapidly during
blocks of trials in which a preferred food (e.g.,
apple rather than potato) or fluid maintained
responding. In addition, neurons that were
more responsive during unreinforced trials
also were more active when the less-preferred
reinforcer was available. These neurons, ac-
cording to the authors, coded not only the
absence of reinforcement, but also which
reinforcer would be absent. A small percent-
age of neurons fired according to a more
complex pattern: The rate of firing for some of
these neurons was highest during reinforced
trials, prior to preferred reinforcers, and also
during omissions of the less-preferred rein-
forcer relative to omissions of the more
preferred reinforcer (Watanabe et al., 2002).
The frequent finding that some neurons fired
at a higher rate prior to a signaled larger
reinforcer and other neurons showed the
opposite pattern was a critical aspect of Gold
and Shadlen’s (2001) description of brain
decision-making based on sensory input.
Behavioral measures in these types of studies
also showed that responses to the larger or
more-preferred reinforcer differed from those
to the smaller or less-preferred reinforcer
(e.g., shorter latency or decreased probability
of visual fixation breaks; Watanabe et al.,
2001). The possibility that these behavioral
differences were responsible for the different
rates of neuronal firing has been considered.
Although some research found reinforcer
magnitude-related differences in neuronal
firing in the association cortex and none in
the motor-related areas (Leon & Shadlen,
1999), others observed that more precise
recordings in the motor cortex clearly re-
flected the magnitude of the reinforcer
(Roesch & Olson, 2003). The latter investiga-
tors subsequently reported that the orbito-
frontal cortex seemed to code the magnitude
of the reinforcer, firing most rapidly immedi-
ately after presentation of the larger-reinforcer
cue. Activity of the premotor cortex, in
contrast, was more related to motor prepara-
tion, arousal, and attention; firing more
rapidly just before the trigger stimulus was
presented and when the reinforcer was de-
livered (Roesch & Olson, 2004).
These studies taken together indicate that
several areas of the brain reward circuit
contain neurons that are responsive to the
magnitude or value of signaled reinforcers.
Various investigators have taken different
positions with respect to the significance of
these findings, some suggesting that these
areas code reinforcer magnitude, others pro-
posing that the differential firing rates reflect
consummatory or motor responses that are
correlated with reinforcer magnitude. All seem
to agree, however, that these simple firing
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differences are not sufficient to explain the
formation of discriminations among reinforc-
ers of different magnitude or type, or to clarify
how animals choose among reinforcers. None-
theless, this research represents an important
first step to a better understanding of where
and how decisions are made within the brain.
The techniques for single neuron recordings
eventually should permit simultaneous mea-
surements from a number of brain areas,
making it possible to track how incoming
stimuli pass through the brain. Measurements
that follow the neuroanatomical description
of cortical-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-cortical cir-
cuit eventually may lend physiological support
to this notion, or demonstrate a much more
complicated interaction. Finally, theories such
as those of Gold and Shadlen (2001, 2002),
who proposed mathematical rules of brain
decision-making, will direct increasingly so-
phisticated research in this area.
There have been two recent reports on
neuronal activity during more complicated
behavioral tasks involving choice. Sugrue,
Corrado, and Newsome (2004) employed
a choice procedure in which the ratio of
reinforcement for responding on two variable-
interval schedules varied several times over the
course of a session. Monkeys modified their
selection of response options (visual saccades
to one of two colored targets) quite rapidly
within the session in accordance with the
matching law (Herrnstein, 1961). To account
for the observed rapid sensitivity to local shifts
in relative reinforcement rate, Sugrue et al.
proposed a modification of the matching law
that minimized the influence of previous
reinforcers through the use of a ‘‘leaky’’
integrator (for a competing model of dynamic
choice, see Davison & Baum, 2000).
Sugrue et al. (2004) also recorded activity of
single neurons in the lateral intraparietal
(LIP) area of the posterior parietal cortex, an
area shown by Platt and Glimcher (1999) to be
responsive to reinforcer magnitude when
oculomotor decisions were required, and
perhaps involved in spatial memory and motor
planning. (e.g., Colby & Goldberg, 1999)
Interestingly, the authors reported that neu-
rons in this region exhibited a firing rate
proportional to the relative reinforcement rate
of the stimulus associated with the alternative
currently presented within the cell’s response
field. As a population, the neurons did not
reflect relative reinforcement rate immediately
when the visual stimuli were presented; the
difference in firing rate as a function of local
reinforcement rate increased over the time
course of the stimulus presentation and ‘‘re-
set’’ after reinforcer delivery. The authors
used this ‘‘reset effect’’ as one reason to
speculate that the LIP is not the primary locus
for computing reinforcement rate. The prima-
ry locus that encodes reinforcement rate
should maintain that representation across
the appropriate time scale of the task. The
LIP, the authors reasoned, may be involved in
the transformation of the color-based repre-
sentation of reinforcement rate to spatial eye-
movement. This conforms to the notion of the
LIP as an area that guides eye movements and
shifts in visual attention based on incoming
information.
Neuronal activity apparently related to the
outcome of a previous trial was observed in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex by Barraclough,
Conroy, and Lee (2004). Monkeys were
trained to make saccade responses to one of
two targets according to one of four different
strategies. In one, the two targets were
different colors, and a response to one of the
colors was reinforced 50% of the time. In the
other three algorithms, the computer engaged
the monkeys in a zero-sum game. In the first of
these three algorithms, the computer selected
the target to be reinforced on a random basis,
and the monkeys developed a side bias. In the
second, the computer took the animals’ pre-
vious choice behavior into account, and the
monkeys responded in a primarily win-stay-
lose-switch manner. In the third, the computer
took both choice and reinforcement history
into account, and the monkeys responded in
a fairly random manner. In each case, mon-
keys behaved optimally, with the optimal
strategy resulting in a reinforcement probabil-
ity of 0.5.
Single neuron recordings taken from the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during respond-
ing maintained under the third algorithm
indicated that some neurons in this area were
responsive to the choice and outcome of the
previous trial. For example, when a monkey
selected a target, one neuron fired differen-
tially based on whether the selection of that
target had been reinforced on the previous
trial; firing rates were higher if the selection
on the previous trial was not reinforced.
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Barraclough et al. (2004) concluded that
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex might
be the locus at which stimuli related to
past choices and their outcomes might be
temporally integrated to influence current
choice.
In an excellent recent review of much of this
work, Schultz (2004) emphasized game theory
and microeconomics as important tools for
neuroscientists involved in understanding de-
cision-making processes at a neural level. He
found reinforcement theory to be less helpful
because it ‘‘does not produce optimal learning
and performance’’ (p. 144). This is an un-
fortunate criticism, not only because it is
incorrect, but because it may reflect a bias
that could impede collaboration between
neuroscientists and behavior analysts. Scien-
tists who analyze behavior are in a unique
position to contribute to this methodology,
and their input is critical to the ultimate
success of a neuroscientific analysis of drug
abuse (Skinner, 1938/1991).
In summary, electrophysiologists are becom-
ing more interested in searching for neural
correlates of choice behavior, and their exper-
imental designs and techniques are becoming
more sophisticated. Given the questions
that are unanswered by these initial studies
of the neuroscience of choice, it may be too
soon to assume that a consensus eventually
will be reached on where and how the
brain assigns value to different stimuli and
directs a choice between them. Ultimately,
however, questions of how various drugs of
abuse compare with each other and to non-
drug reinforcers might be answered at a neu-
ronal level, as might questions about whether
these relationships change as addiction pro-
gresses.
These questions about neuronal correlates
of reinforcement are closely tied to the issues
addressed in the next section: Do drugs
function differently from nondrugs as rein-
forcers at the neuronal level? If there is
a qualitative difference between drug and
non-drug reinforcers, this might support the
notion of many neuroscientists that drugs
‘‘hijack’’ the reinforcement pathway (e.g.,
Lubman et al., 2004). If no clear differences
are observed, then it becomes more reason-
able not to place drugs in a ‘‘special’’ category




DRUG AND NON-DRUG REINFORCEMENT
There have been a few studies of electrical
activity in the brain during drug-reinforced
responding. Of particular interest are those
from Deadwyler and colleagues. Deadwyler,
Hayashizaki, Cheer, and Hampson (2004)
recorded activity from one to four neurons in
the nucleus accumbens of rats that responded
and received either cocaine or water reinforc-
ers. Throughout the session, the two reinforc-
ers were available on distinct levers, only one
of which was available at a time. Deadwyler et
al. found that there were different neurons in
the nucleus accumbens that responded simi-
larly regardless of whether the reinforcer was
water or cocaine. These neurons displayed one
of three different firing patterns, although
each was characterized by a brief, profound
decrease in activity at the time the operant
response was made. Some neurons showed
increased activity before the response or any
overt movement towards the lever, others
showed an inverse pattern of increased activity
following the response, and the third type
showed increased activity both before and
after the response.
The firing patterns in these neurons were
similar for both cocaine- and water-maintained
responding, suggesting that drugs of abuse
mediate reinforcement through the same
neural mechanisms and firing patterns as
other reinforcers. Interestingly, the individual
neurons activated by water and cocaine were
completely different and each type fired in
a reciprocal manner. Thus, cells that showed
activity related to cocaine reinforcement were
quiescent when water-maintained responding
was occurring, and cells that showed activity
related to water delivery were quiescent when
cocaine-maintained responding was occurring.
Although these neurons could be proximal to
one another, none of the neurons of interest
fired simultaneously to both reinforcers.
‘‘Rather, it appears that different reinforcers
‘sculpt out’ different connections within a pool
of common [nucleus accumbens] neurons,
such that individual circuits with the same
firing characteristics will be independently
activated under a restricted set of conditions
dependent upon both the type and magnitude
of reward.’’ (Deadwyler et al., 2004, p. 706).
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Similar studies reviewed by Carelli (2002)
demonstrated that a subset of cells in the
nucleus accumbens showed phasic activity
following a response reinforced by food, water,
or sucrose. A similar pattern of activity was
shown in cells when cocaine was response
contingent, but these were an entirely differ-
ent population of cells. The apparent magni-
tude of reward (water vs. sucrose) was not
reflected by accumbens firing rate. Chang,
Janak, and Woodward (1998) found that
different cells in the nucleus accumbens were
responsive to cocaine- as compared with
heroin-reinforced behavior.
These studies suggest that the nucleus
accumbens codes different reinforcers in
a similar way, but on different neurons. It is
possible that there are a sufficient number of
accumbens neurons to account for the variety
of reinforcing stimuli in the environment, but
it would be interesting to evaluate activity in
this nucleus following delivery of a wider
variety of reinforcers. In addition, it is of
considerable interest to the neuroscience of
drug abuse to evaluate neural responses to
drug reward in other brain regions. For
example, although the accumbens appears
not to play a role in distinguishing reinforcer
magnitude, regions such as the orbitofrontal
or dorsolateral parietal area, as shown in the
previous section, seem to reflect these differ-
ences. How do these areas respond in animals
given access to different doses of cocaine, or to
food versus cocaine? Would responses to
cocaine change during the development of
cocaine addiction? These types of questions
may be more useful in approaching the
neuroscience of drug abuse than research on
how drug administration alters brain molecu-
lar biology.
Dopamine has long been considered to be
involved in mediation of reinforcement.
Schultz (1998), for example, measured elec-
trophysiolgical activity from dopamine cells in
monkey midbrain and found that these cells
fired when unsignaled (unpredictable) food
was delivered to the animals. When the food
delivery was signaled, the dopamine cells
ceased to respond to the food delivery, and
responded instead to the predicting signal.
A relation between dopamine release in the
nucleus accumbens and administration of
drugs of abuse was reported several years ago
(Di Chiara & Imperato, 1988), and has been
followed up by several investigators. This
relation was based on the measurement of
extracellular dopamine levels over several
minutes following drug delivery. The recent
development of fast-scan cyclic voltammetry,
a technique that measures extracellular dopa-
mine levels in neuronal tissue on a subsecond
time scale, has made it possible to correlate
much more closely the temporal pattern of
dopamine changes within the context of
ongoing operant behavior. The possibility that
changes in neuronal dopamine can be moni-
tored nearly as closely as firing rates of
dopamine neurons eventually should lead to
interesting comparisons. Although to date
only a few studies have examined dopamine
release using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry
during ongoing operant behavior, more will
soon be known about how dopamine and
other neurochemicals change during various
types of ongoing behavior.
Roitman, Stuber, Phillips, Wightman and
Carelli (2004) described dopamine release in
the ventral striatum of rats when each lever
press resulted in intraoral sucrose delivery.
They found that each time the levers and cue
light were presented, dopamine levels in the
ventral striatum began to increase, peaking at
the time the lever press was emitted. Dopa-
mine levels then declined quickly to baseline
levels during the delivery of the sucrose
solution. By comparison, these cues did not
evoke dopamine increases in animals that had
not learned the response-sucrose contingency,
and the light-tone stimulus alone in untrained
rats also did not result in changes in dopamine
levels. Interestingly, whereas rats typically
responded immediately after the lever was
presented, on some occasions the rats paused
for nearly 30 s before emitting a response. In
these situations, the cue-induced increase in
dopamine was less than that observed when
the latency to respond was short. However,
dopamine levels increased just before the
press, peaking at the time of the response, in
a similar pattern to what was obtained when
latencies were short. This suggested that
‘‘phasic dopamine is time-locked to approach
behavior,’’ and may have a specific role in
selecting the motor output related to the cue.
This same group (Phillips, Stuber, Heien,
Wightman, & Carelli, 2003) evaluated subse-
cond dopamine release in the ventral striatum
during cocaine self-administration sessions in
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rats. Similar to the findings with food-rein-
forced responding, increases in dopamine
began as the rat approached the lever and
peaked just after the response was made. This
finding suggests the possibility, as did the
evaluation of dopamine release during su-
crose-reinforced responding, that there was
an important motor component to accumbens
dopamine release. The consistency of the
dopamine increase before the motor response
led the investigators to produce similar pat-
terns of dopamine release in the ventral
striatum by electrically stimulating the ventral
tegmentum every 120 s throughout an other-
wise normal cocaine self-administration ses-
sion. Ventral tegmentum stimulation was
followed by a rapid increase in accumbens
dopamine and by behavioral sequences that
typically ended in a lever press.
These latter two studies of dopamine release
in the nucleus accumbens during behavior
reinforced either by food or by cocaine are
inconsistent with earlier studies of the electro-
physiological response in dopamine cells that
occurs when signaled and unsignaled food is
delivered. In Schultz’s studies (e.g., Schultz,
1998), there was no response contingency, and
dopamine cells fired when food delivery was
signaled, or, if no signal was given, by the food
delivery itself. In the studies by Carelli and
colleagues (Phillips et al., 2003; Roitman et al.,
2004), a response contingency was trained,
and dopamine release in the accumbens
appeared to accompany the motor response
rather than the delivery of the sucrose or
cocaine reinforcer. Interestingly, neurochem-
ical activity, as was found previously with
electrical activity, appears to be similar regard-
less of whether drug or non-drug reinforcers
are being delivered. Although this may be the
result of an identical behavioral response
requirement, it remains a provocative finding
supporting the notion that neural systems may
not treat drugs differently from the way they
treat other reinforcers, at least in animals that
have rather limited exposure to drugs. This
suggests that research of this type might
eventually help to test a behavioral approach
to drug addiction.
CONCLUSIONS
The techniques developed by and available
to neuroscientists are truly awesome, and will
certainly become even more so in coming
years. The ability to detect or modify gene
expression in local brain areas at specific times
in development, to measure real-time changes
in neurotransmitter levels, and to watch the
electrical responses of single neurons in
behaving animals has begun to make inroads
in our understanding of an extremely complex
nervous system. Neuroscientists almost always
attempt to relate their findings to behavior,
and a collaboration with behavioral scientists
could only be beneficial to both disciplines.
The studies in which a correlation was ob-
served between brain activity and monkeys’
responding on concurrent VI schedules (Su-
grue et al., 2004) provide an excellent example
of such a collaboration in which sophisticated
operant techniques were employed to examine
reward circuitry in the brain. This and similar
studies of the neuroscience of reinforcement
and choice seem especially promising in
determining how the brain changes during
the process of drug addiction. This area is still
in its infancy and faces important challenges.
For example, is observed brain activity associ-
ated with reinforcement or with the motor
response that accompanies reinforcement?
The problem of measuring neurological cor-
relates of reinforcement with minimal or no
overt behavior is also a challenge to which
behavioral scientists must rise.
Unfortunately, there has been limited in-
teraction between behavioral scientists and
most of the laboratories directly involved in
the neuroscience of drug addiction. This may
be the result of fundamental differences in the
constructs invoked to describe the develop-
ment of addiction. Behaviorists reject the
prevalent neuroscientific notion that drugs
themselves are responsible for the develop-
ment of addiction, and see addiction not
primarily as a ‘‘brain disease,’’ but as a behav-
ioral disorder that cannot be separated from
the prevailing and historical contingencies of
reinforcement.
In addition to the differences in the
approach to addiction, the absence of a collab-
oration between these groups of scientists also
can be attributed to the fact that behavioral
scientists, even those of us interested in drug-
related behavior, have not established and
validated a model of addiction that could be
used by neuroscientists to test, extend, and
perhaps refute, their hypotheses. Such a model
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might involve reliable measures of reinforcer
efficacy or strength (e.g., of a drug reinforcer),
or measures of reinforcer preferences (e.g.,
between food and drug), and how these might
change as a consequence of chronic drug
administration or drug self-administration.
Behavioral scientists have much to offer
neuroscientists, and drug addiction might be
an appropriate place for these two disciplines
to meet. In addition, neuroscientific data
ultimately could be of interest to behavior
analysts for more fundamental reasons, such as
closing temporal gaps in demonstrated func-
tional relations between historical variables
and current behavior (Skinner, 1974), and
relating current behavior to events at the
neurological level when information about
the historical environment is inaccessible. If
we behavioral scientists can rise to the chal-
lenge that neuroscience presents, and if
neuroscientists can appreciate the improve-
ments we might be able to offer them, there is
clearly much to be gained in both of these
areas of scientific endeavor.
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